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This article combines a rational choice framework with an analysis of contemporary European 
Union institutions to elucidate the causes of Grexit and Brexit. It shows that the sustainability of 
the EU in part or whole in “normal” times depends on member compatibility and coercive adapta-
tion. If members share the same values, including a common vision of transnational governance 
and a commitment to mutual support (solidarity), the EU should be able to stick together through 
thick and thin. If, on the contrary, members hold incompatible outlooks on the distribution of tran-
snational powers and solidarity, then the EU will be vulnerable to dismemberment. The EU today 
is prone to disunion because its members no longer share a common view of mutually acceptable 
transnational government and policy; powerful members insist upon bending recalcitrant members 
to their will (coercive adaptation), and participants hold contradictory attitudes towards solidarity 
on a variety of issues. Winston Churchill and Robert Schuman in the late 1940s hoped that their 
post-war Europe project would be something more than a “single market”; that it would become the 
cornerstone of European peace. They appreciated the value of cooperative economy, but considered 
material benefi ts icing on the cake. Brexit and Grexit are best seen in this larger perspective under-
scoring the wisdom of conciliation.
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1. TRANSNATIONAL CLUBS
The European Union can be likened to a transnational club composed of sov-
ereign nations outsourcing some governing powers to club officials. The divi-
sion of powers between self-regulating members and club officials creates a two-
level control regime intended to harmonise personal (local) and board members 
(transnational interests). The approach works adequately when club officials and 
members see eye to eye, but requires mutual accommodation otherwise.
      There is no ideal transnational club. Bounded rationality and ethical plural-
ism permit multiple satisfying arrangements, but no universal best (Simon 1957, 
1990, 1991; Tisdell 1996; Rubinstein 1998; Gigerenzer – Selten 2002; Kahneman 
2003; Rosefielde – Pfouts 2014). Nonetheless, general competitive individual 
utility-seeking with learning and permissible taste change provides an instruc-
tive benchmark. It requires members to negotiate and renegotiate rules as cir-
cumstances dictate so that participants continuously maximise their utility and 
well-being, including rules of entry, expulsion, withdrawal, and re-entry. The 
watchword is free choice. Members decide for themselves whether to accept or 
reject the group consensus. When acquiescence is tolerable, they stay. If it isn’t, 
they leave.1 
2. FORMATION AND EVOLUTION OF THE EURO CLUB
Nation states before World War II never voluntarily surrendered control over their 
fiscal, monetary, financial, legal, defence, education, social, and foreign policy 
as part of a package to achieve common goals, even though they participated in 
international institutions like the League of Nations. The horrors of the war, com-
bined with Cold War politics and the welfare state tide, however, propelled Eu-
rope along a novel supranational trajectory with some unintended consequences. 
On September 19, 1946, Winston Churchill gave a speech in Zurich not only 
advocating Franco-German rapprochement, but a kind of United States of Europe 
called a European “Third Way.” Churchill can be considered the EU’s founder. 
He also advocated a “Council of Europe” formed thereafter with the assistance 
of French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, mandated to create supranational 
communities on the path to a fully democratic, integrated Union.2 The Schuman 
Declaration of May 9, 1950, reaffirmed the concept in conjunction with the for-
1  This is how the South defined the United States prior to the Civil War.
2  The term supranational community was coined by Jean Monnet, Head of France’s General 
Planning Commission.
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mation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS). It proclaimed the 
European Community as the world’s first supranational institution, marking the 
“birth of modern Europe”, and initiating an epoch where intra-European wars 
were impossible.3 
Schuman’s utopian vision, which can be traced back to France’s first socialist, 
Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) (On the Reorgani-
zation of European Industry, 1814), was the prelude to a succession of develop-
ments culminating in today’s European Union, including the European Economic 
Community (EEC), known as the Common Market (1958), the European Com-
munity (1967) (together with the European Commission and the European Coun-
cil of Ministers), the European Council (1974), the European Monetary System 
(1979), the European Parliament (1979), the Schengen Agreement (1985) which 
opened intra-union borders, the Single Market Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty 
(1993) founding the European Union (EU),4 and the European Monetary Union 
(2002), which inaugurated the euro. On December 1, 2009, the Lisbon Treaty 
entered into force and reformed many aspects of the EU. In particular, it changed 
the legal structure of the European Union, merging the EU three pillars system 
into a single legal entity,5 creating a permanent President of the European Coun-
cil, and strengthening the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy.6
Membership in Churchill’s and Schuman’s club was open to any European 
nation willing to participate in a supranational community on the path to dis-
covering whether the group could devise a satisfactory fully democratic federal 
entity. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands ac-
cepted the agenda in 1958 and seem content with their decision with the possible 
3  In 2012, the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize for having “contributed to the advancement 
of peace and reconciliation, democracy, and human rights in Europe.”
4  The European Union’s seven principal decision-making bodies are the European Council, 
the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the European Commission, the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, and the European Court 
of Auditors.
5  The term three pillars refer to (1) Economic, social and environmental policies performed 
by the European Community (EC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, until 
its expiry in 2002), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM); (2) Foreign 
policy and military under the jurisdiction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
and (3) Judicial and police matters undertaken Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal 
Matters (PJCCM).
6  The military of the European Union comprises the various cooperative structures that have 
been established between the armed forces of the member states, both intergovernmentally 
and within the institutional framework of the union; the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) branch of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
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exceptions of the Netherlands and France, which are under pressure for Nexit and 
Frexit.7 They were pleased both with the Common Market and subsequent ef-
forts to expand the political, social, juridical, police, foreign, and defence policy 
aspects of the union. They all want to continue the search for an amicable united 
European federative state with supranational characteristics, and perhaps without 
them (super-state).8
Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined the founding six members in 1973. 
The British and Danish publics were Eurosceptics from the outset. Their leaders 
were attracted to the economic benefits of tariff elimination in a common market, 
but were more ambivalent about deeper economic and political integration, in-
cluding subsequent monetary union, proposals for supranational regulation fiscal, 
political, social, juridical, police, foreign affairs, and defence matters.9 Britain 
and Denmark refused to join the euro zone.
  The policy area of defence is principally the domain of nation states. The main military al-
liance in Europe remains the intergovernmental North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 
which presently includes 22 EU member states together with 4 non-EU European countries 
(Albania, Iceland, Turkey, and Norway) as well as the United States and Canada. The de-
velopment of the CSDP with regard to the existing role of NATO is a contentious issue. The 
military form of European integration, however, has intensified in the beginning of the 21st 
century, bringing about the deployment of numerous CSDP operations and the establishment 
of EU battle groups. The latter, however, have never been engaged in operations, and other, 
recent examples of military integration such as the European corps, gendarmerie force, and 
air transport command are intergovernmental, and outside the institutional framework of the 
union.
7  A poll by the Pew Research Center in June 2016, before the British referendum, found the 
Dutch to have a 46% negative view of the European Union, less than the 51% of their popula-
tion was found to have a positive view towards it. The Pew Research Center poll found 61% 
of the French population held an unfavourable view of the EU, second only to Greece’s 71%, 
with the UK at 48%. 
8  Margaret Thatcher warned against an EU super-state in 1988 (Palmer 1988). 
9  The governing bodies of the EU’s supranational governance tier are the European Parlia-
ment, Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the European Council, 
European Central Bank, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the European Court 
of Auditors. Supranational bodies have exclusive competence over (1) the “customs union”, 
(2) competition policy, (3) euro zone (EZ) monetary power, (4) a common fisheries policy, 
(5) a common commercial policy, and (6) conclusion of certain international agreements. 
They also have the right to shared competence in (7) the internal market, (8) social policy 
for aspects defined in the treaty, (9) agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of 
marine biological resources, (10) environment, (11) consumer protection, (12) transport, 
(13) trans-European networks, (14) energy, (15) the area of freedom, security, and justice, 
(16) common safety concerns in public health aspects defined in the treaty, (17) research, 
development, technology, and space, (18) development, cooperation, and humanitarian aid, 
(19) coordination of economic and social policies, and (20) common security and defence 
policies. Additionally, supranational bodies enjoy supporting competence in (21) protection 
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Greece and Spain became EU members in the 1980s, both aware of efforts to 
construct a European monetary union, open borders, and create a “single market”. 
They and the 15 other countries that signed on after the Soviet Union’s demise 
primarily sought economic benefits, but also agreed to explore the federative pos-
sibilities urged by the founding six under the slogan “more Europe”. The details 
of federation with supranational characteristics remain as elusive today as they 
were at the outset of the project. What will be the characteristics of an all-union 
trans-nationalised culture, and who will rule at the end of the day? Will there be 
a hegemon, or will democracy prevail? 
Fiscal union
Proponents of “more Europe” are understandably loath to offer specifics about 
the distribution of real authority, but nonetheless have pressed this agenda under 
the banner of fiscal union. The slogan “more Europe” for the moment means per-
fecting the single market, establishing a lender of last recourse for the euro zone, 
and complementing monetary union with a unified transnational fiscal system 
that will supplant aspects of national taxing authority and strengthen suprana-
tional public policymaking. Most macroeconomic theorists believe that a fed-
eration will empower sound macroeconomic management and restore prosperity 
(De Grauwe 2010; Rosefielde – Razin 2012a, 2012b; Sargent 2012; Rosefielde 
2015; Razin – Rosefielde 2016). It promises a generally competitive, optimally 
macro-managed economically integrated system with “inclusive” sensibilities 
(Tirole 2015; Dallago forthcoming).
3. EUROSCEPTISM
Eurosceptics don’t deny the virtues of economic efficiency, stability, integrat-
ed macroeconomic management, coordinated supranational public policy, and 
social humanism. They acknowledge the microeconomic benefits of widened 
markets, free trade, and finance, but contend that Eurocrats cannot deliver what 
they promise and have hidden agendas (Mundell 1961, 1963; Fleming 1962; 
McKinnon 1963). They believe that full costs will exceed the gains. Specifically, 
they assert that Brussels and Berlin abuse their decision-making powers in their 
and improvement of human health, (22) industry, (23) culture, (24) tourism, 25) education, 
youth sport, and vocational training, (26) civil protection (disaster prevention), and (27) 
administration.
82 STEVEN ROSEFIELDE
Acta Oeconomica 66 (2016)
own interest and seek to undemocratically expand their control not only over the 
EU economy, but comprehensively over all dimensions of members’ political, 
social, cultural, foreign, and defence activities (Bolton 2016). They recognise 
that Brussels and Berlin portray themselves as skilful benevolent technocrats, 
but contend that “more Europe” insiders act primarily on their own behalf at 
others’ expense.10 
 Eurosceptics also maintain that members like Britain, which had hoped to 
cherry pick, taking the good and avoiding the bad by insisting on strong national 
autonomy within a trans-nationalising framework, are discovering that this is a 
losing game. The “more Europe” camp is gradually imposing its will on the EU, 
forcing dissenters to accept the new normal, or leave. There are no longer any 
prospects for “less Europe” to accommodate club members who prefer a weaker 
form of association. Transnationalism and supranationalism in the eyes of Euro-
sceptics have become hollow concepts.
They see the European transnational economic union as a failing project, 
compounded by democratic disempowerment (Dallago 2016a; Dallago et al. 
2016). The Greeks are particularly adamant on this point. The British by con-
trast place the emphasis the other way round. They don’t want to be ruled by 
Brussels and Berlin, and are less concerned about economics. A large segment 
of population is disgruntled by EU economic rules and regulations, but the pain 
is less acute than in Greece. The issue of democratic disempowerment voiced by 
Greece and Britain has been widely documented in the political science litera-
ture where the problem is characterised as a “democratic deficit” (Piattoni 2016). 
The term taken seriously by many political scientists has gained little traction 
among economists, but deserves attention when trying to comprehend Grexit 
and Brexit. British voters came to believe that the EU bureaucracy is opaque, 
and British interests are overwhelmed by those of other EU members, espe-
cially Germany. A nonpartisan analysis concluded that approximately 60% of 
all legislation enacted by Britain’s Parliament was dictated, in whole or in part, 
by decisions already reached by Brussels bureaucrats or EU diplomats (Bolton 
2016; Dallago 2016 a).
10  Gretschmann (2016): “Both in economic and political terms, the EU is on life support. Its 
former attractiveness as an economic powerhouse, a political ‘soft power’ and a much appre-
ciated social model seems to be waning in the face of the Eurozone troubles and the political 
and military challenges at its borders.” 
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Empty promises 
Eurosceptics might grin and bear lost national political and economic autonomy 
if the European Union and the euro zone were uniformly prosperous.11 However, 
there is no convincing economic evidence that all club members have benefited 
(Rosefielde 2016). This seems counter-intuitive because theory stresses the ben-
efits of liberalisation, free labour and capital mobility, outsourcing, technology 
transfer, and globalisation (Razin – Rosefielde forthcoming). Many prominent 
economists at the time of Brexit insisted that it was irrational for Britain to with-
draw from the club (e.g. Giles 2016). However, there is more to economics than 
optimally competitive utility-seeking. Bounded rationality and power often gen-
erate and entrench undeserving winners and losers. 
Moreover, the economic costs of exiting are easily overstated by ignoring alter-
native opportunities. Much can be accomplished in all these regards without the 
single market as the experiences of China, Vietnam, India, and Israel attest (Razin 
– Rosefielde forthcoming). Moreover, the economic benefits of club membership 
have steadily diminished. EU growth rates have been declining asymptotically 
toward zero since the UK and Denmark joined the European Community in 1973 
(Eurosclerosis), with the exception of the short-lived growth spurt 2000–2008 ac-
companying the euro’s adoption (Maddison 2003). The EU has been afflicted by 
secular stagnation since 2008 and double digit member unemployment is wide-
spread. Real wages have fallen precipitously, income and wealth inequality have 
burgeoned, and the EU has underperformed the United States (Piketty 2014). All 
these negatives can be blamed on other forces, or it always can be argued that 
the EU saved members from even worse fates, but it is also easily understood 
why Eurosceptics deem these claims excuses. Klaus Gretschmann reminds us 
that the EU regulators extended their reach without cogent justification.12 Over-
regulation is wasteful by definition and often impedes growth by warping and 
disincentivising innovation, technological progress, entrepreneurship, and invest-
ment. Over-regulation devitalises national economies; hegemonic supranational 
over-regulation compounds the problem by adding a second level of obstruction 
and waste.
11  Greer – Jarman (2016): “The whole apparatus of fiscal governance and conditional lending… 
is entrenched in law, treaties, and member state constitutions, and in theory subjects member 
states to a broad, deep, and automatic mechanism that shapes their fiscal and therefore public 
policies.”
12  Gretschmann (2016): “The EU has turned into a legislative machine trying to interpret her 
fields of competence ever more widely. Ceaselessly, the Commission is working on weav-
ing an ever closer web of harmonized European laws and regulations – the result thereof, the 
‘acquis communautaire’, is presently estimated to comprise some 100,000 printed pages.”
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4. GREXIT
 Greece provides an object lesson on complexities swept under the rug by as-
suming that competition and solidarity heal all wounds under prevailing Lisbon 
Treaty arrangements. Athens was both an early beneficiary and victim of the 
Maastricht Treaty. It joined the euro zone in 2001 and immediately enjoyed an 
investment bonanza as EU and foreign funds flooded the GIIPS (Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) in response to an implied euro zone creditworthi-
ness guarantee (Rosefielde – Razin 2012).  Hard asset prices, especially land 
and property values skyrocketed. Per capital GDP rose 25%, narrowing the gap 
with the EU average in 2001–2008. Unemployment, especially among the youth, 
declined significantly. The Greek government capitalised on the strong euro and 
the implied creditworthiness guarantee to amass a huge national debt, much of it 
owed to foreigners. A large portion of these capital inflows funded an expansion 
of public service sector jobs, increased salaries, and benefits. Athens and German 
investors were both delighted until the bubble burst. 
The global financial crisis of 2008 reversed the process. Suddenly, Greece 
was no longer creditworthy and Germany demanded that Athens adopt “austere” 
fiscal measures to assure debt repayment to German banks and private investors. 
Greek leaders appealed for debt relief and were accommodated four times (2010, 
2012, 2015 and 2016), but to little avail.  By 2012, Greeks’ per capita real GDP 
was the same as in 2001 and had fallen to 74% of the EU average. Employment 
gains vanished and youth unemployment rose above 50% (Figure 1), despite a 
sharp austerity impelled internal devaluation (Tartar 2015). 
Figure1. Labour Gains Quickly Erased. Joblessness among young Greeks fell 
by 8 percentage points in the first seven years with the euro before sky-rocketing 
by more than 40 percentage points.
Source: Eurostat.
Note: Youth unemployment refers to people under 25 years of age.
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The hardship inflicted by this rollercoaster ride prompted a democratic revolt. 
On July 5, 2015, 62% of Greeks voted to reject an EU, ECB, and IMF backed 
debt relief package, effectively opting for Grexit.  If the Greek people had their 
druthers, their leaders would have cancelled Greece’s club membership. Prime 
Minister Alexis Tsipras however decided instead that discretion was the better 
part of valour. He chose to sign a deal worth EUR 86 billion over three years 
laden with conditions such as tax hikes and pension reforms, considered by critics 
to be so tough that social media buzzed with talk of a coup d’etat.
Tsipras’s capitulation in the face of a popular mandate can be variously in-
terpreted.13 Some construe it to mean that the Prime Minister grasped the indis-
pensability of euro zone membership regardless of the intermediate term costs. 
Some portrayed it as a “sellout” that sacrificed the public good for the benefit 
of powerful insiders, while others attributed his action to the risk of devastating 
punitive actions by the ECB. The latter interpretation is the most interesting from 
the standpoint of appraising the EU’s future. It points to the possibility that the 
EU’s merit depends not only on rational free choice, but on the risks of hegem-
onic economic and political coercion.
Supranational capital fl ight
Greece may have been brought to its knees by capital flight of a novel sort 
that took most observers by surprise. Greeks began withdrawing unsustainable 
amounts of euro deposits from private banks because they correctly feared that 
the ECB might cut off currency supplies in an attempt to jawbone Tsipras into 
accepting structural reform. Capital flight traditionally has been associated with 
hot money fleeing currencies ripe for devaluation. The Greek case was differ-
ent. Euro devaluation wasn’t an issue. Depositors fled Greek banks because they 
wanted to retain access to the euro, not because they feared euro devaluation. 
They recognised that the ECB might curtail euro access and that Greek banks 
might collapse if a run-for-the-liquid-euro couldn’t be accommodated because 
banks assets were illiquid.14
13  Polls taken before July 15 showed a plurality of Greeks favoured remaining in the EU. Al-
though, Greek voters knew that a vote against the EU, ECB, and IMF backed debt relief pack-
age could be construed as a vote for Grexit if creditors stuck to their guns, earlier poll data 
gave Tsipras the wiggle room he needed to capitulate on the debt and Grexit. This was the 
course that he chose.
14  The literature on borrowing (incentive compatible) constraints is based on Holmstrom –Tirole 
(1997). One basic mechanism outlined in recent currency crisis models is where unhedged 
foreign currency liabilities play the key role in causing and transmitting crises. One of the first 
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The phenomenon can be labelled supranational capital flight because it is a 
logical consequence of the EU governance scheme, which allows national banks 
to operate with a currency that national authorities do not control. Rational actors 
foreseeing a looming confrontation between supranational and national authori-
ties will always find it costless to take their money and run, holding euros in cash, 
redepositing them in Helsinki or purchasing other currencies.
This vulnerability and the difficulty of quickly re-adopting the drachma were 
invisible as long as cooperation and consensus were mandatory.15 Shutting the 
models to capture this joint problem was presented in Krugman (1999) and Schneider –Tornell 
(2004). In this approach, firms suffer from a currency mismatch between their assets and li-
abilities: their assets are denominated in domestic goods, and their liabilities are denominated 
in foreign goods. Then, real exchange rate depreciation increases the value of liabilities rela-
tive to assets, leading to deterioration in firms’ balance sheets. Chang – Velasco (2001) show 
the vicious circle between bank runs and speculative attacks on the currency. On the one hand, 
the expected collapse of the currency worsens banks’ prospects, as they have foreign liabilities 
and domestic assets, and thus generates bank runs. On the other hand, the collapse of the banks 
leads to capital outflows that deplete the reserves of the government, encouraging speculative 
attacks against the currency. Accounting for the circular relationship between currency crises 
and banking crises complicates policy analysis. For example, a lender-of-last-resort policy or 
other expansionary policy during a banking crisis might backfire as it depletes the reserves 
available to the government, making a currency crisis more likely, which in turn might further 
hurt the banking sector that is exposed to a currency mismatch. See De Grauwe – Ji (2013) for 
the lender-of-last-resort role, and Razin (2015) for a survey.
15  Bulow – Rogoff (2015) write: “It is true that a major early motivation for the EU to lend to 
Greece was to subsidize its banks, but it is not true that Greece’s creditors were taking money 
out of the country, at least until the Greeks chose to postpone or stop meeting the terms of 
its second bailout deal in the second half of 2014. Europe continued to provide cash inflows 
to Greece until that time, on top of the banking system support it still provides, and arguably 
does not really expect to be a net receiver of very much if any money over the next few years 
(at the very least). The bailout deals negotiated with Greece were meant to provide it with the 
cash needed to ease the transition from running primary deficits in its heavy borrowing years 
and to help keep its banks running and its private creditors at bay. The problems that Greece 
faces are due to a loss of confidence in the state, not only by foreign private investors but 
also by Greece’s own citizens. Indeed, the latter have withdrawn over a hundred billion euros 
from the banking system since the onset of the crisis in early 2010. While Europe has replaced 
much of this money through Target2 loans (now primarily ‘Emergency Liquidity Assistance’) 
the Greek banks have also been weakened by the 33.5% of their private loans that are non-
performing, reducing their capacity to take on new risky loans. It is partly for this reason, as 
well as because of the losses Greek banks suffered in 2012 on their holdings of Greek Govern-
ment Bonds, that a significant part of the new money that Greece received over the past five 
years had to be used to recapitalise Greek banks.
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ECB spigot (TARGET 2) was unimaginable.16 Now that the genie is out of the 
bottle, however, it can be assumed that coercive methods, including euro zone su-
pranational capital flight could be invoked whenever debt to GDP ratios expand 
and the danger of confrontation within EU governance structures looms. 
5. BREXIT
Britain’s decision to cancel its membership in club EU is only obliquely con-
nected with Grexit. Voters were aware of Greece’s plight, but Britain was not a 
euro zone member. Supranational capital flight therefore was irrelevant. Nor was 
Britain over-indebted by the standards of other EU members.17 It post-financial 
crisis growth and employment were the best in the EU. Some argued that Brit-
ain’s macro performance would have been more vibrant if it weren’t entangled 
with the EU. However, the principal grievance motivating referendum voters 
was forced public goods substitution, including control over migrants and refu-
gees. Eurosceptics felt that Eurocrats restricted local public policy choice, gener-
ated strong downward wage pressure, exacerbated involuntary unemployment, 
intensified unwelcome foreign labour migration (Dallago – McGowan 2016), in-
  Whereas the EU has actually been a net provider of funds to Greece since the beginning of 
the crisis, this is not to say that its motivation has been entirely charitable. Greece has been 
able to combine the threat of default (which would create an unknown and potentially massive 
risk for the EU), a promised commitment to economic reforms that would put it on the road to 
self-sufficiency, and its ‘too small to fail’ status to gain extraordinary financial support. Over 
time, the risks of ‘Grexit’ – Greece leaving the euro – while still unknown, appear to have 
lessened for most observers. At the same time, the Greeks have recently elected a party seem-
ingly intent on rolling back some of the country’s hard-won economic reforms, negotiations 
have become harder. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that in any deal Greece would be asked 
to pay back as much cash as it receives in net subsidies from the EU, at least for a long time to 
come.” (www.voxeu.org/article/modern-greek-tragedy)
16  TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer Sys-
tem) is the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system for the euro zone, and is available to 
non-euro zone countries as well. There is no upper or lower limit on the value of payments. 
This means that the ECB had an instrument in place to prevent Greek Euro capital flight if it 
had chosen to do so. Instead, it permitted Greece and others to receive long-term low interest 
credit in lieu of instantaneous settlement. This technically is what gave the ECB the power to 
jawbone the Greek government over its bank capital flight. The ECB could have approached 
the problem earlier on a prudential basis, but for reasons unknown to the author, didn’t.
17  The UK’s debt to GDP ratio in 2015 was 90.6 percent. Portugal’s debt to GDP ratio in the same 
year was 129 percent. The figure includes intra governmental debt is substantially lower than 
the American counterpart figure. CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-
tions/the-world-factbook/geos/uk.html).
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creased terrorist risk, and drew them too deeply into Germany’s political orbit 
(Mills – Rosefielde 2016). Moreover, they argued that Eurocrats were unelected 
and unresponsive to the British people’s will.18
It can be counter-argued that British voters were ill informed about these is-
sues in varying degrees, but truth is peripheral to the larger question of EU sur-
vivability. Advocates of “more Europe” displayed an inability to defuse griev-
ances essential for the survival of the Greater Europe project.  
One country, two systems
Brussels and Berlin are unlikely to significantly accommodate demands for “less 
Europe” anytime soon. Their convictions are deeply held. Nonetheless, the time 
seems at hand for an intra-EU discussion of a third way. The Chinese concept of 
“one country, two systems” employed by Beijing to accommodate Hong Kong 
may provide a fruitful institutional compromise. Advocates of strong suprana-
tionality, including a super-state with token transnational characteristics, can be 
likened to Beijing; club members desiring “less Europe” to Hong Kong. Both 
systems can share a mutually agreeable core set of supranational arrangements, 
adjusted to reflect local needs. EU strong supranationalists in this framework 
would be free to negotiate more comprehensive common rules and a unified 
monetary-fiscal transnational accord among themselves while weak supranation-
alists either abided by the common core, or narrowed it to taste, and members 
of both EU groups were permitted to switch sides. Europhoric and Eurosceptic 
countries under this scheme could modify the terms of membership to suit their 
changing needs without having to ponder exiting the club.
Other considerations
The one country, two systems formula also provides a suggestive framework for 
dealing with non-economic issues. The scope of the EU concerns broadened in 
1967 to include political, social, defence, and foreign policy when the club be-
came the European Community. The interests of the six founding members were 
sufficiently congruent to make this possible, and the same principles were ap-
18  These issues weren’t bolts from the blue. They appear to the author to have come to a head be-
cause of mounting concerns about terrorism, refugees, and immigration; the resentment of lo-
cal authorities to Brussels’ encroachment, the political determination of Brexit advocates, and 
mounting antagonism between EU winners in London and loser everywhere else in England.
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plied as membership grew, facilitated by the demise of the Soviet Union and 
the breakup of its empire. The diversity of interest among club members proved 
manageable during the halcyon days, but the façade of unanimity is wearing thin 
today as a consequence of mounting global terror threats, refugee crises, ethnic 
and religious pressures, and Putin’s annexation of Crimea. The Visegrad four, for 
example, don’t want to compromise their national identities, a concern easily ac-
commodated in a less doctrinaire “united Europe”.
World order 
Winston Churchill and Robert Schuman hoped that their new post-war Europe 
project would be something more than a “single market”; that it would become 
the cornerstone of European peace and perhaps the kernel of a new World Order. 
They appreciated the value of a cooperative economy, but considered material 
benefits icing on the cake. The United States and Germany still want the EU to 
serve this vital function, but may have forgotten that mutual conciliation within 
the union is the sine qua non for lasting success.
6. CONCLUSION
The EU today is prone to conflict and disunion because its members, in response 
to changing global realities, no longer share a common view of mutually accept-
able transnational government and policy; powerful members insist upon bend-
ing recalcitrant members to their will (coercive adaptation), and participants hold 
contradictory attitudes towards solidarity on a variety of economic, political, so-
cial, and cultural issues. Brussels and Berlin are likely to redouble their efforts 
for “more Europe” rather than meaningfully accommodate the disaffected and 
may well muscle their way forward Dallago (2016b, 2016d); however, a more 
flexible plan B analogous to China’s “one country, two systems” scheme that 
accommodates special needs within a broader union may well prove more effec-
tive. Any virtuous solution requires members to negotiate and renegotiate rules 
as circumstances dictate so that participants continuously maximise their utility 
and well-being, including rules of entry, expulsion, withdrawal, and re-entry. The 
watchword is democratic free choice for all anti-authoritarian clubs and, by ex-
tension, the construction of a larger and harmonious World Order.
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